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In recent years, the scope of federal criminal law has expanded to unprecedented levels in the United States. During
this period, a number of problems have emerged in the federal criminal law regime, including overfederalization,
weak limits on federal prosecutors, and the influence of ordinary politics on decisionmakers. Consequently, criminal
law scholars and commentators have begun to demand significant reforms with regard to defining, prosecuting, and
punishing federal crimes. This article supports constraint of
the modern federal criminal law regime through greater attention to, and use of, congressionalinvestigation and oversight powers. Through an analysis of the 2009 and 2010
United States House of Representatives hearings on overcriminalization,this article asserts that Congress has political and constitutional incentives to use its investigationand
oversight powers to address these problems. Conventional
wisdom asserts that political disincentives to reduce the federal criminal law regime and weaknesses in investigative
and oversight powers limit congressional effectiveness.
While recognizing the merits of the conventional wisdom,
this article argues that it is overstated-that institutional
powers and incentives for reform exist-and that constitutional government demands healthy conflict between the leg* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. LL.M.,
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islative and executive branches in this area. By seriously
consideringprudential and constitutionallimits on the definition of criminal law and by exercising congressionalprerogatives to counterbalance the executive branch'spowerful
role in shaping it, serious congressionalinquiry of the federal criminaljustice regime can help to restore a vigorous constitutionalgovernment in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION

Hardly anyone, it seems, really believes that the scope of federal criminal law is just about right. Though academics and
commentators across the spectrum of law and politics rarely find
general agreement when it comes to federal power, there actually
appears to be relatively broad agreement these days that some
things about federal criminal law are not quite right. In particular, the issue has brought together minds from both the political
left and the political right,' making criticism of federal criminal
law one of the issues du jour among commentators struck by the
marriage of these strange bedfellows. Indeed, although it is the
conventional wisdom that conservatives have generally favored
the government in criminal justice adjudication,2 it is the most
conservative members of the Supreme Court who have emerged
as prominent champions of structural (and even some rightsbased) limits on federal criminal justice powers, often siding with
criminal defendants.' Whether the concern is "overfederalization"

1. See Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join Forces on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2009, at Al; Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Prisons of Our Own Making, N.Y. TIMES,

(Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/opinioni/14douthat.html. Notable conservative political leaders have even started a website dedicated to criminal justice reform. See RIGHTONCRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going:
Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 412 (1998)
(addressing the traditional view of political conservatives on criminal law).
3. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 700 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that in denying certiorari the Court has "tacitly accept[ed] the nullification of our recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence" that placed limits on federal commerce power); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit civil commitment of sex offenders released from federal custody because the law does not execute any
enumerated power); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582, 1592 (2010) (holding

that federal law criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty violated the First Amendment); see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359-60 (2011) (holding, in Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court joined by all Court conservatives, that a criminal defendant could challenge a federal criminal statute on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's
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and the exercise of congressional power beyond constitutional
limits,' or the duplication of resources that occurs when state and
federal crimes too often overlap,' or the danger that people of dubious culpability will be ensnared in a vast web of obscure federal
laws about which they had no reason to know,' or the increasing
severity of federal sentencing for crimes that cause comparatively
little harm or that involve offenders who pose comparatively low
risk to the community,' thoughtful minds across the political
spectrum are bothered by the sheer scope of the federal government's power to prosecute and punish crimes, and the relative
ease with which federal assertions of criminal law enforcement
power occur. 8
It is unclear, however, the extent to which Congress-the one
body that could directly address the problem-shares these concerns. For all of the public criticism of federal criminal law, and
the omnipartisan nature of the criticism, the growth of federal
criminal law has continued unchecked. The American Bar Association's Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law indicated in a 1998 report that by the early 1980s, there were about
3000 federal crimes.9 Another subsequent study, conducted by
John Baker, then concluded that by the year 2000, there were
about 4000 federal crimes.1 o Baker's most recent study places the
total number of federal crimes at about 4450, with Congress cre-

enumerated powers).
4. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization,and the Politics of Crime, 98
W. VA. L. REV. 789, 799-809 (1996).
5. See Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1247, 1248-49 (1995).
6. See HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE
INNOCENT xxvi-xxxi (2009); Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You're (Probably)a Federal
Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE 43-49 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); see also Gary
Fields & John Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate,More Are Ensnared,WALL ST.
J., July 23, 2011, at Al (detailing examples of minor conduct subjected to federal criminal
prosecution).
7. See David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives:A Response to
ProfessorFlanders,70 MD. L. REV. 141, 145, 158 (2010).
8. See generally Ashdown, supra note, 4 at 791-94 (discussing the rapid expansion of
federal criminal law in the twentieth century).
9.

TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 94 (1998).
10.

JOHN BAKER, JR., FEDERALIST Soc'Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLIcY, MEASURING THE

EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 8 (2004); see also John S. Baker, Jr.,
Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal

Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 546, 549-54 (2005) [hereinafter Baker, Strategiesto Limit
Expansion] (further detailing the data).
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ating 452 new crimes between 2000 and 2007-about 56 new
crimes per year, and about 500 every decade since 1980." Moreover, a recent report from the Administrative Office of United
States Courts shows that criminal prosecutions again increased
in the federal system in fiscal year 2010, and that a new record
was set for the number of criminal defendants charged in federal
court (100,366).12 The report also shows that criminal appeals
dropped by seven percent," suggesting the possibility that many
defendants are foregoing appellate rights in exchange for reduced
charges or for recommendations of reduced sentences in plea
agreements. If that hypothesis is accurate, it reaffirms the belief
that federal prosecutors wield tremendous authority through
their plea bargaining powers, authority that can shape the substantive criminal law.14 Additionally, a recent study by Pew indicates that while the state prison populations have recently decreased, the federal prison population has actually continually
increased.'" Indeed, in light of the current public debate about
federal spending, deficits, and the size of the federal government,
one could plausibly argue that the federal prosecutorial and carceral regimes might be an excellent place to begin some trimming
of the federal fat.
The national legislature, to be fair, has not been entirely deaf
to the loud calls for reform. One congressional subcommittee has
recently conducted hearings into many of the problems that
scholars and commentators on both the left and the right have
identified in the federal criminal law regime." In July 2009, the

11. John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, LEGAL
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), June 16, 2008, at 1, 1 [hereinafter
Baker, Revisiting Growth].
12. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Filings in the Federal Judiciary Continued to
Grow in Fiscal Year 2010, UNITED STATES COURTS (Mar. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/
News/NewsView/11-03-15/FilingsjintheFederalJudiciaryContinued toGrow inFis
calYear 2010.aspx.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869, 871 (2009) (stating that federal prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining powers help make prosecutors more than
mere enforcers; they are the "final adjudicators" in most cases); see also William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargainingand Criminal Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548-50
(2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Plea Bargaining] (arguing that plea bargains can dictate the
terms of a prosecutor's menu of options under the substantive criminal law).
15. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS 1, 5 (2010).
16. Over-Criminalizationof Conduct/Over-Federalizationof Criminal Law: Hearing
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House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security conducted a hearing entitled "Over-Criminalization
of Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law."" The Subcommittee heard from former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh; Timothy Lynch of the CATO Institute; law professors Stephen Saltzburg and James Strazzella; and two impact witnesses,
one whose husband was prosecuted for a low-level crime involving the filing of the wrong paperwork, and one who was prosecuted for mislabeling a shipment and for various environmental offenses." The Subcommittee conducted a second hearing entitled
"Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions," in September 2010." The Subcommittee again
heard the testimony of criminal law experts and victims of overcriminalization, including the president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Brian Walsh of the Heritage
Foundation, law professors Stephen Smith and Ellen Podgor, and
two more impact witnesses." During each hearing, the Subcommittee received information about the dangers of unchecked
prosecutorial discretion and of creating and enforcing such a vast
body of criminal laws, many of which capture behavior that is insufficiently culpable to warrant criminal sanction.21
Yet those hearings have yielded no significant legislative
movement on these issues to date, either by the Judiciary Committees in the House and Senate or by Congress as a whole. In
fact, even during the 111th Congress, after receiving expert testimony on the dangers of such a far-reaching set of criminal
laws,22 Congress continued to propose and consider numerous
pieces of legislation that would expand, not contract, the scope of
federal criminal law.22 Finally, in July 2010, the House passed a

Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing].
17. Id.

18. Id. at 5, 20, 33, 38-39, 43-45, 52, 65.
19. Reining in Overcriminalization:Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing].
20. Id. at 11, 21, 35, 46, 62, 86.
21. See generally 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 19; 2009 OverCriminalizationHearing, supra note 16.
22. See generally 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 19; 2009 OverCriminalizationHearing,supra note 16.

23.

See, e.g., Fighting Gangs & Empowering Youth Act of 2010, S. 3695, 111th Cong.

§§ 301-302 (2010) (creating new crimes related to participation in, and recruiting of per-
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version of the National Criminal Justice Commission Act, first
introduced in the Senate by Senator Jim Webb and reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in early 2010.24
This legislation was designed to address a range of federal criminal justice issues, including code reform through the appointment of a commission comprised of experts on criminal law, law
enforcement, and criminal sentencing.2 5 It did not survive the
111th Congress's expiration.26
These recent examples highlight a recurring problem on Capitol Hill, and one that goes far beyond the subject of federal criminal law: committee room rhetoric that yields no substantive legislation or reform. Every year, various congressional committees
conduct fact-finding inquiries or legislative oversight on criminal
justice matters. Yet every year, the size of federal criminal power seems to increase.28 So the problem is not new and not likely to
sons to participate in, criminal street gangs); Fighting Gangs & Empowering Youth Act of
2010, H.R. 5969, 111th Cong. §§ 301-302 (2010) (same); Medicare Fraud Enforcement and
Prevention Act of 2010, H.R. 5044, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (enhancing criminal penalties
for Medicare and Medicaid fraud); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2009, S. 2878, 111th
Cong. § 3 (2009) (adding new crimes related to firearms trafficking); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 4298, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (same); One Strike Act, H.R. 1753,
111th Cong. (2009) (amending definition of aggravated felony in the Immigration and Nationality Act to include crime committed by illegal aliens); Child Gun Safety and Gun Access Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 257, 111th Cong. §§ 5-6 (2009) (adding new crimes for
death and injury to a child caused by child's access to firearms and for failing to ensure
that a child is accompanied by an adult when a child attends a gun show).
24. See National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2010, H.R. 5143, 111th Cong.
(2010); Press Release, Office of Senator Jim Webb, Webb's Nat'l Criminal Justice Comm'n
Wins Approval in House of Representatives: Senator Calls for Swift Passage in the Senate
(July 28, 2010), available at http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/07-28-201002.cfm. For the original bill proposed by Senator Webb, see National Criminal Justice
Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. (2009).
25. See H.R. 5143 §§ 3-4, 6(b); see also Press Release, Office of Sen. Jim Webb, Webb's
National Criminal Justice Commission Wins Approval in House of Representatives; Senator Calls for Swift Passage in the Senate (July 28, 2010), available at http://webb.senate.
gov/newsroom/pressreleases/07-28-2010-02.cfm.
26. Senator Webb reintroduced the bill in the 112th Congress. See The National
Criminal Justice Commission Act, JIM WEBB: U.S. SENATOR FOR VIRGINIA, http://webb.
senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/criminaljusticeandlawenforcement/CriminalJusticeBan
ner.cfm (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
27. See, e.g., Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2011) (conducting oversight of the FBI); Combating
Organized Retail Crime-the Role of Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2009) (hearing testimony from representatives of four federal law enforcement
agencies regarding theft from retail establishments); Federal Bureau of Investigation:
HearingBefore the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (conducting oversight of the FBI).
28. See Baker Revisiting Growth, supra note 11, at 1-2 (tracking the increase in
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disappear. At least in the specific context of federal criminal law
reform, it is fair to wonder just how serious the House and Senate are about "reining in" the problem.
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that scholars have generally
not embraced congressional oversight and investigation as meaningful avenues of federal criminal law reform. In a 1984 article,
Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz criticized the "widespread mistake" that Congress has neglected its oversight responsibilities.29 The authors proposed a model of evaluating congressional oversight that distinguishes "police-patrol" oversightin which Congress directly confronts, at its own initiation, an
administrative or executive branch agency through a centralized
process designed to detect and remedy violations of legislative
preferences-from "fire-alarm" oversight, in which Congress establishes a decentralized system of rules and procedures by
which citizens can complain of agency or executive branch conduct and seek a remedy." They concluded that fire alarm oversight is Congress's preferred oversight method, so what appears
to be congressional neglect is actually an effective tool for maintaining executive branch compliance."' That model is more difficult to assess, though, in the context of criminal law reform. The
citizens who would be in a position to sound the alarm may not
always be a desirable constituency for Congress to publicly rescue. And Congress may have little incentive for providing them
with the kinds of remedies they would seek, as the executive
branch officials of whom they complain (prosecutors and law enforcement agents) may be a far more sympathetic bunch. Indeed,
recent commentary has described Congress as the "broken
branch"" and has concluded that the institutional failure to conduct meaningful oversight is among the reasons for this lack of
*33
action.

crime legislation); Barkow, supranote 14, at 870-71 (describing the increase in the prison
population and the concomitant increase in prosecutorial powers).
29. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police PatrolsVersus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCl. 165, 165, 176 (1984).
30. Id. at 165-66.
31. Id. at 176.
32. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH:
How CONGRESS Is FAILING AMERICA AND How To GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006).

33.

See Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair 'The Broken Branch'?, 89

B.U. L. REV. 765, 765-66 (2009). For some excellent thoughts on constitutional consciousness and congressional inability to assert its prerogatives, see Jeffrey K Tulis, On Con-
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Perhaps, then, as Rachel Barkow reasons, the realities of ordinary politics make criminal law reform politically undesirable,
and for many of the same reasons, perhaps members of Congress
do not want to be seen in the hearing room questioning the authority of law enforcement officials.34 Daniel Richman's thoughtful work on Congress and criminal law has suggested that Congress can meet its enforcement preferences through the
appointment process (hearings on nominees) and through congressional inquiries that can help to impose costs on the law enforcement community if it is functioning poorly." Yet rather than
explore the specific relationship between congressional inquiries
more broadly and reform of the substantive criminal law, Richman focuses on the problem of delegating enforcement power to
prosecutors, the nature of congressional interactions with the executive branch, and the "extent to which enforcers' decisions are
likely to reflect legislative preferences."" Still, the executive
branch (or more precisely, the Justice Department) will often resist congressional overtures toward reform," and Congress will
ultimately accede to the executive branch's wishes." But even assuming this dynamic is true, there is still something valuable
about the opportunity for conflict and its process-that is, the inquiry that implicitly asserts congressional prerogatives, the resistance that asserts executive prerogatives, and the opportunity
for a congressional response that more aggressively asserts congressional prerogatives.

gress and Constitutional Responsibility, 89 B.U. L. REV. 515, 517 (2009) (contrasting Congress's positive action during the financial crisis of 2008 with its more regular feebleness,
and concluding that "[iut is more accurate . . . to describe Congress today as in a state of
decay, rather than in total constitutional dysfunction").
34. Barkow, supra note 14, at 911.
35. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789-93 (1999) [hereinafter Richman, Federal
CriminalLaw].
36. Id. at 787-88. Richman's subsequent work has examined some of the same
themes, noting the strategic use of oversight, as well as discussing some of the most recent examples of congressional efforts to control federal criminal law enforcement. See
Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking
Forward,58 DUKE L.J. 2087, 2108-16 (2009) [hereinafter Richman, Political Control]. In
particular, Richman focuses on the decentralization and autonomy of local United States
Attorneys Offices and notes the risks associated with congressional demands for greater
centralization. See id. at 2093-94.
37. See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 35, at 791 (stating that "the solicitude that enforcers show to legislators is often limited to the duration of the hearing
itself').
38. Id. at 806.
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So can congressional inquiry-which I use here as an umbrella
term to describe either fact-finding hearings relevant to a pending or contemplated piece of legislation, or direct legislative oversight of the executive branch-serve as a meaningful avenue for
federal criminal law reform? That is the one topic this article explores, and one that has been undervalued in the existing literature on federal criminal law." This article thus relies upon extant
law and scholarship to explain the need for criminal law reform
in the first instance, then explains why congressional inquiry
should be a more prominent part of the conversation about
achieving that reform, comparing this approach to the avenues of
reform suggested by other scholars that have noted with concern
the increased federalization of the criminal law and the sheer
breadth and harshness of the federal enforcement regime. Using
the 2009 and 2010 over-criminalization/over-federalization hearings as a case study, this paper shows that Congress has
acknowledged many of the problems of federal criminal law, yet
has failed to take additional necessary steps to curb it. Committee members may see no political upside to challenging the requests of Justice Department officials for enhanced prosecutorial
tools or to reforming the substantive criminal law in ways that
narrow federal prosecutorial power. And yet, senators and representatives could use the oversight process to develop viable political and constitutional arguments for limiting the scope of federal
crime and to hold Justice Department officials publicly accountable for charging practices, pleas, and sentencing recommendations that contribute to the problem. Ordinary politics may determine whether investigation and oversight can produce reforms
beyond hearing room rhetoric, but the marriage of left and right
on the issue of federal criminal law reform has at least enhanced
the prospects. Ultimately, this article advances the federal reform conversation by focusing upon whether the committee process can produce more robust constitutionalism and a healthy inter-branch conflict, where constitutional and institutional
interests overcome (or at least coexist with) ordinary politics to
improve the criminal law. By enabling sober and informed discourse about constitutional limits in defining the criminal law,

39. I briefly introduced this notion-albeit in a far less developed manner-in J.
Richard Broughton, Some Reflections on Conservative Politics and the Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 537, 563-64 (2010). My goal here is to further develop the idea and assess its potential.
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and by asserting congressional prerogatives to hold executive
branch actors accountable for their own roles in perpetuating the
federal criminal law behemoth, robust congressional inquiry of
the federal criminal justice regime can help to restore at least
some of Congress's constitutional consciousness.
II. GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME

Our threshold question concerns the necessity of federal criminal law reform. After all, congressional hearings and congressional oversight would be superfluous if the state of federal criminal law was not problematic. But the research and literature
overwhelmingly suggest that is not the case.
Substantial literature exists on overcriminalization, the idea
that we have too many criminal sanctions for conduct,4 0 and overfederalization, the idea that we have too many federal criminal
laws, and, if many of these actions are to be criminalized at all,
state criminal law is a more appropriate forum. 4 1 Some of the objections to federal criminal law are constitutional and jurisdictional. Many scholars have argued that the increasing breadth of
the Commerce Clause beyond its proper boundaries has led Congress to adopt more and more criminal laws under the authority
of that provision, and that this has had profound consequences
for constitutional federalism." Others ground their objections in
40. See generally Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:From
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (2005);

Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization,86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 223-24 (2007);
Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand
the Moral Content of Regulatory Offense, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535-36 (1997); Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 1958 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 417 (1958);
Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
SCl. 157, 158-59 (1967); Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 703, 704-12 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics].
41. See generally Ashdown, supra note 4, at 799-804; Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime
Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 839-40
(1996); Kadish, supra note 5, at 1247-50; Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough

on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalizationof
State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 505-06 (1995). But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton,
The Underfederalizationof Crime, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 249-50 (1997) (arguing that commentators complaining of overfederalization overlook federal government's
steady decline in criminal law enforcement). For a different perspective on the federalism
debate, see Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 Mo. L. REV. 389, 418-27 (2003)
(arguing against the contention that federal criminal legislation is subject to federalism
challenge solely because of state criminal law on the same subject).

42.

See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization of American
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policy concerns. Some are concerned about enforcement and the
idea that federal prosecutors wield a stick that is too large, which
inevitably results in abuse and irresponsible prosecutorial decisionmaking." Some are concerned that Congress (not unlike other legislatures) drafts criminal laws too broadly and too often
fails to narrow the scope of federal criminal liability with, for example, mens rea elements that the government would otherwise
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Still others fear the
problem of punishment severity and mass incarceration, which
are incident to the growth of federal criminal law and the resulting increase in prosecutions, convictions (and therefore more
prisoners), and strained budgets and resources at a time of outrageous deficits and slow economic growth.45
The factors contributing to this metastasizing of federal criminal law are familiar and well-chronicled, but I will summarize
the main considerations that may be relevant to an examination
of congressional investigations and oversight, and I will describe
how those considerations were at issue during the 2009 and 2010
overcriminalization/overfederalization hearings.
A. Ever-Expanding ConstitutionalAuthority to Define Crime
First, constitutional authority to enact criminal laws has
grown over the past century, and Congress has not foregone the
opportunity to use that growth to criminalize a wide range of
conduct." The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause is the most notable contributor to this phenomenon." Every student of constitutional law knows that the
Supreme Court's post-1937 approach to the commerce power left

Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172-73 (1995); Henry J. Friendly, Federalism:A
Foreword, 86 YALEL.J. 1019, 1026-27 (1977).
43. See Barkow, supra note 14, at 874-87; Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalizationof Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 705-08 (1997).

44. See Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Should Be Charged
with Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1059, 1061-65 (2005).

45. See David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradoxof Severity in American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 457 (2001) (stating that "[t]here can be little doubt
that the United States is a world leader in penal severity"); Michael A. Simons, Sense and
Sentencing: Our Imprisonment Epidemic, 25 J. C.R. & EcON. DEV. 153, 155, 157-59 (2010)
(attributing American mass incarceration in part to federal sentencing practice).
46. See Henning, supra note 41, at 418-27.
47. See Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalizationof Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
825, 825-26, 832, 841-42 (2000); Henning, supranote 41, at 418-27; Mengler, supra note
41, at 511-12.
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few meaningful limits on that authority.48 But the commerce
power accounts not just for federal regulation of the marketplace,
but also for a substantial number of federal crimes, ranging from
bank robbery and drug crimes to racketeering and firearms trafficking.9
The most significant modern case limiting congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, United States v. Lopez, was a criminal case that invalidated the Gun Free Schools Zones Act, which
prohibited knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone.o In
Lopez, the Court clearly stated its view that not only does Congress lack a general police power, but the field of criminal justice
is one that the Constitution leaves primarily to the states."' Yet
even after Lopez, Congress simply followed the Court's formula
and crafted a new statute with a jurisdictional element; indeed,
the jurisdictional element is used in legislating many federal
crimes as a way of demonstrating to courts that Congress is attempting to reach only those activities that fall within the reach
of the Court's substantial effects doctrine, per Lopez.52 Whatever
the merits of Lopez, and the subsequent case attempting to amplify its underlying constitutional premise, United States v. Morrison,53 these cases have not substantially deterred congressional

48. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
49.

See NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 18-

23, 41-42, 48, 54 (5th ed. 2010). For excellent perspective on the range of federal crimes
enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause authority, see id. at 18-75.
50. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
51. Id. at 561 n.3, 566.
52. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) (2006) (making it a federal crime for a person with a
prior violent felony conviction to purchase, use, or possess body armor, which is defined in
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(35) as "any product sold, or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign
commerce, as personal protective body covering intended to protect against gunfire"); cf.
George D. Brown, Constitutionalizingthe Federal CriminalLaw Debate: Morrison, Jones,
and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 1022-23 (stating that "left unaddressed, jurisdictional elements have the potential to undermine [Lopez and Morrison] entirely'); Clymer,
supra note 43, at 656 (stating that federal courts have "broadly construed" jurisdictional
elements).
53. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). It may be possible to add to this list of judicially enforced
federalism cases the recent decision in Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
There the Court considered the case of a Pennsylvania woman, Carol Ann Bond, who, upon learning that another woman had become impregnated by Bond's husband placed
caustic substances on objects the other woman was likely to touch. Id. at 2360. The victim
suffered a minor burn. Id. Bond was prosecuted under a federal law that Congress enacted as part of an international chemical weapons treaty. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2006)).
She claimed the statute was beyond Congress's authority to enact, but the court of ap-
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creation of criminal offenses. Moreover, the limits set forth in
Lopez and Morrison, while still factoring in Commerce Clause
analysis, have been undermined by Gonzales v. Raich, which
permitted Congress to reach intrastate, noncommercial criminal
activity-the cultivation and use of home-grown, locally consumed marijuana for medicinal use, which was lawful under California law but prohibited by the Federal Controlled Substances
Act-based on the notion that Congress could have a rational basis for concluding that marijuana consumption could substantially affect the interstate market." The Raich Court also repeated
the proposition, stated in 1971 in Perez v. United States (a significant case for the expansion of federal criminal law), that a reviewing court cannot "excise, as trivial, individual instances" of a
class of activity that otherwise falls within the scope of federal
power, even if those particular instances are intrastate and noncommercial." Even Justice Scalia, who joined the Court in limiting federal commerce power in Lopez and Morrison," and who
has generally been an aggressive supporter of judicially enforced
federalism," approved of the exercise of federal power in Raich."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia separately concluded that
the Necessary and Proper Clause provides an adequate source of
constitutional authority where the regulation of even noneconomic, intrastate activity is essential to a broader scheme of economic
regulation."

peals said she lacked standing. Id. at 2360-61. The Supreme Court reversed on federalism grounds, holding that a defendant seeks to vindicate her own constitutional interests
when asserting that a federal criminal statute exceeds congressional power and interferes
with state prerogatives pursuant to the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 2363-64. The decision
may be of limited significance to broader criminal jurisprudence, however, as the Court
did not, and had no occasion to, hold that the statute was in fact unconstitutional. Id. at
2367.
54. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005); see also George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?-National Criminal Law After Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 948-49, 991 (2005)
(arguing that Raich will contribute to the expansion of federal criminal law and break
down the distinction between two levels of government and describing how Raich undermined Lopez and Morrison).
55. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23, 32-33 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600, 607-16 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550, 556-62 (1995).
57. Justice Scalia wrote the Court's opinion in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
902, 935 (1997), and joined the Court's federalism-protective decisions in, for example,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710, 759 (1999), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509,
536 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 147, 188 (1992).
58. Raich, 545 U.S. at 33, 41-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 38-42.
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As for the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court recently
announced a broad understanding of that Clause as it applies to
federal criminal justice.6 0 Although the Supreme Court in United
States v. Comstock upheld a civil commitment statute,6 the
Court's opinion plainly implicated the scope of federal crimecreation and sentencing authority, for it was the power to create
the underlying federal crime that Congress was "carrying into
[e]xecution" when it devised a civil commitment scheme for released federal prisoners.62 The Court explained that while congressional power to criminalize conduct is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,63 "Congress nonetheless possesses
broad authority" to create crimes, punish offenders, and enact
laws governing prisons and prisoners in the course of "carrying
into [e]xecution" its enumerated powers.64 In fact, the Court held
that legislation may be constitutionally valid if it is more than
one step removed from the enumerated power that it seeks to execute.65
B. OrdinaryPolitics and the Race to Be "Tough"
A second explanation, though one often buoyed by the anemic
structural limits on congressional power, is ordinary politics. The
empty "tough on crime" and "soft on crime" labels still reverberate in the world of politics, and the conventional wisdom is that
office seekers assigned the latter label will typically fare worse
among the voting public.66 Consequently, politicians who restrict
60. See generallyUnited States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).
61. Id. at 1954 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006)).
62.

Id. at 1954, 1958.

63. Id. On its face, this would seem to be a strange way of describing the constitutional text, which does, in fact, specifically empower Congress to criminalize some forms
of conduct, including piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses
against the law of nations (which Congress may "define" as well as "punish"). U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 10. The Constitution also specifically speaks of punishing counterfeiting and
treason. Id. at cl. 6. The Fifth Amendment, which applies only to the federal government,
also refers to "capital" crimes, indicating its understanding that Congress might create
legislation targeting conduct that would be punishable by death. Id. amend. V. Yet Justice
Breyer includes language elsewhere in his opinion which refers to these powers (though
he does not refer to the Fifth Amendment). Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957.
64. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 1963-64.
66. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalismand the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1276, 1277-78 (2005) (explaining that political dialogue about criminal punishment
is irrational because "tough-on-crime" rhetoric has resulted in the movement of modern
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the scope of a criminal sanction or who are seen as being uncooperative with, or unhelpful to, the law enforcement community
could be subject to negative labeling. Moreover, the constituency
for criminal law reform is unclear. Although all citizens could
benefit from a federal criminal law that is leaner, more rational,
more focused on highly culpable actors, and more consistent with
a federal government of limited and enumerated powers, legislators may feel that the only real beneficiaries of reform are the
"bad guys" or those with a propensity to commit crimes-hardly a
constituency worth protecting, in the mind of the typical legislator. So legislators lack electoral incentives to reform criminal law
in the direction of fewer crimes or reduced punishments.
Another phenomenon of criminal lawmaking is the immediate
rush to create new criminal laws in the wake of some public tragedy or notorious crime." Even if existing criminal laws are adequate, legislators perceive obvious political benefits that come
from proposing new crimes." This phenomenon is made more
palatable by the availability (or at least the arguable availability)
of constitutional power to expand the existing criminal code."
This is not to say that all legislative responses to high profile
criminal episodes are illegitimate. Many of them are entirely appropriate and potentially necessary to protect vital national and
public interests. These responses merely offer yet another explanation for congressional enlargement of the federal criminal law
that stems from the perceived demands of ordinary politics.
Beyond these common explanations, Bill Stuntz offers a more
nuanced view of the unique politics of federal criminal lawmaksentencing law in a single direction, and advocating shorter sentences or reform could resuit in the "soft on crime" label); Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal

Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1203, 1251 (2006) (stating that federal legislators have incentives to be "tough-oncrime," and this makes it unlikely that they will have much concern for state interests);
Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supra note 40, at 509 ("Voters demand harsh treatment of
criminals; politicians respond with tough sentences (overlapping crimes are one way to
make sentences harsher) and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly powerful the last two decades, as both major parties have participated in a kind of
bidding war to see who can appropriate the label-'tough on crime."').

67.

See Ann-Marie White, Comment, A New Trend in Gun Control: Criminal Liability

for the Negligent Storage of Firearms,30 HOUS. L. REV. 1389, 1419 (1993) ("One reason for
[increasing prison populations] is a 'knee-jerk' reaction of legislators responding to wellpublicized crimes, tragedies and public interest groups.").
68. See Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supranote 40, at 510.

69.

See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV.

L. REV. 780, 781-82 (2006).
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ing. According to Stuntz, crime definition is relatively lowvisibility work, typically with little political gain."o Congress,
though, has an incentive to make symbolic statements through
the criminal law, and can use its greater public visibility to add
political value to those statements (which usually come in the
form of efforts to address some outrageous conduct).' In addition,
Congress passes laws that federal law enforcers want, and it regularly defers to the preferences of the Justice Department and
federal law enforcement agencies because those agencies seem to
carry considerable weight in the public conscience. So when the
Justice Department asks for some crime-fighting tool, the request
has credibility, and Congress takes a political risk if its spurns
the request. Moreover, Stuntz's work concludes, legislators are
almost always immune from any political backlash that may occur where they overcriminalize or overproscribe sentencing, so
there is little reason not to make the criminal law as expansive
as possible.74
C. The Influence of FederalProsecutors
Finally, though we focus much of the overcriminalization spotlight on legislators, as Stuntz's work demonstrated persuasively
for many years, legislators are often relegated to a less important
substantive lawmaking role than prosecutors. This view of the
prosecutor as the real criminal lawmaker proceeds from the vast
authority that prosecutors enjoy in selecting whom and what to
charge, an authority emboldened by the power of plea bargaining
and the concomitant costs to criminal defendants of a jury trial,
as well as a body of constitutional law that leaves the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion largely immune from judicial review except under the most extraordinary of circumstances.

70. Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supra note 40, at 549.
71. Id. at 546.
72. Id. at 545-46.
73. Id. at 545.
74. See Stuntz, Plea Bargaining,supra note 14, at 2557-58; Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supra note 40, at 548.
75. See Stuntz, PleaBargaining,supra note 14, at 2549; Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics,
supra note 40, at 519; see also Barkow, supra note 14, at 876-79 (describing the dangers
of such a powerful prosecutorial regime).
76. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy RelationshipBetween CriminalProcedure and
Criminal Law, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]. For
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Even as Congress may impose procedural and investigative
limits on federal law enforcement, it sometimes extends the scope
of the substantive law." As Stuntz has explained, Congress passes criminal statutes that "make proof of guilt easier, which converts otherwise contestable cases into guilty pleas, thereby avoiding most of the costs criminal procedure creates."" Consequently,
much of the size of federal criminal law is not attributable to
Congress or to federal judges (whose interpretations of the law
often give Congress great lawmaking latitude) at all, but to federal prosecutors-or more precisely, prosecutors taking advantage of the sweeping tools that Congress gives them but who
do not seem interested in restricting the application of the law.
Rachel Barkow refers to this state of affairs as the "[p]rosecutor
as Leviathan.""0 Like Stuntz, she describes how Congress works
within this framework: Congress enacts laws "with punishments
greater than the facts of the offense would demand," so that
prosecutors can use those statutes advantageously in the plea
bargaining process." Unfortunately, she argues, there is only the
most minimal oversight of federal prosecutors.
D. The CongressionalHearings on the Federal CriminalLaw
Behemoth
Many of these concerns were highlighted at the aforementioned 2009 and 2010 overcriminalization/overfederalization
hearings." At the outset of the 2009 hearing, Subcommittee
Chairman Bobby Scott of Virginia noted the range of organizations across the political spectrum having an interest in this issue and explained that the concern was not just about the rate of
growth but the ways in which Congress passes criminal legisla-

examples of the Court's deference to prosecutorial discretion, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458, 470 (1996); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65
(1978); and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
77. See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supranote 35, at 800.
78. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 76, at 56.
79. See Barkow, supra note 14, at 871-73.
80. Id. at 874.
81. Id. at 880.

82.

Id. at 875, 885-86. Barkow notes that Congress seems to step in when "urged by a

sufficiently powerful interest," identifying the number of high-status offenders in the federal system who have had difficulties with local U.S. Attorneys Offices. Id. at 917-18.
83. See 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 19, at 1; 2009 OverCriminalizationHearing,supra note 16, at 1.
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tion, often using overbroad language and without the use of specific mens rea elements." Similarly, at the opening of the 2010
hearing, Chairman Scott again noted "the disturbing disappearance of the common law requirement of mens rea," and stated
that "[w]e can see the impact of unfair and vague legislation at
the hands of overzealous prosecutors when we look at the prison
population."" Representative Louie Gohmert of Texas, the ranking member on the Subcommittee, explained that the existing
structure of federal criminal law had secured "a de facto [fjederal
police power under which virtually all criminal conduct can be
federally regulated ... . Part of this trend toward overfederalization and over-criminalization [was] the growing expectation that Congress is the arbiter of criminal conduct." Representative Gohmert also noted the prevalence of regulatory crimes
and the absence of criminal intent among many of those offenders.8 1 In his opening statement at the 2010 hearing, Representative Ted Poe of Texas also lamented federal overcriminalization
and focused on the case of Sholom Rubashkin, an Iowa kosher
slaughterhouse operator who was sentenced to twenty-seven
years in federal prison upon conviction for eighty-six counts of financial fraud." Rubashkin was initially investigated for a number of immigration offenses, but the overwhelming number of
charges against him were eventually dropped and prosecutors focused upon his financial crimes." According to Poe, "[w]e proba84. 2009 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 16, at 1-2 (statement of Rep.
Bobby Scott, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crimes, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.).
85. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bobby
Scott, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.).
86. 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 16, at 3 (statement of Rep. Louie
Gohmert, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.).
87. Id.
88. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 9 (statement of Rep. Ted
Poe, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (describing the crime narrowly, as violating the
Packers and Stockyard Act, which punishes failure to pay cattle suppliers within a day of
cattle delivery (which Representative Poe facetiously described as a "dastardly deed")). Id.
A jury ultimately convicted Rubashkin of bank, wire, and mail fraud; false statements;
and money laundering. United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 855 (8th Cir. 2011).
The Rubashkin case received substantial public notoriety, much of it concerning what was
viewed as a grossly disproportionate sentence; six former Attorneys General even complained of the sentence. See Caroline Black, Is Life Sentence Kosher for Sholom Rubashkin, Jewish Slaughterhouse Boss Guilty of $26 Million Fraud?, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 29,
Recently, the
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20003686-504083.html.
Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence noting the sentence was on the low end of the guidelines range and considering the damage caused to the victims of Rubashkin's crimes. See
Rubashkin, 655 F.3d at 869.
89. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 9 (statement of Rep. Ted
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bly need that [prison] space for somebody that's just really an
outlaw.""o
Former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh noted at the 2009
hearing the problem of federal prosecutor power, saying they "are
given an immense amount of latitude and discretion to construe
[flederal crimes and not always with the clearest motives or intentions."" To deal with the overfederalization problem, he advocated an integrated federal criminal code, reform of regulatory
crimes by essentially eliminating them and replacing them with
congressionally approved administrative procedures and sanctions for regulatory violations, and reform of corporate criminal
law by mitigating respondeat superior liability.9 2 Timothy Lynch
followed this statement by repeating the refrain about the "truly
immense" power of federal prosecutors and citing some specific
problems of prosecutorial discretion related to the absence of
criminal intent." For example, Lynch told the story of one man
who served three years in a federal prison because he was unaware that he had to surrender his firearm-purchased lawfullyonce his wife obtained a restraining order during their divorce
proceedings.94 Lynch also described an Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") hotline that was created for the Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act." The hotline was designed to assist
people in obtaining information about the Act's application." The
EPA, however, refused to guarantee the accuracy of information
on the hotline and federal prosecutors refused to allow reliance
on incorrect information to be a defense in a prosecution for violating the Act." His broader point was that Congress should essentially abolish the traditional mistake of law doctrine as well
as codify the rule of lenity" because existing expansive theories of
Poe, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).

90. Id. at 9-10.
91. 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 16, at 6 (statement of Hon. Richard Thornburgh, former Att'y General of the United States).
92. Id. at 6-8.
93. Id. at 20-21 (statement of Timothy Lynch, CATO Institute).
94. Id.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.

98. See id. The rule of lenity provides that if all interpretive mechanisms have been
exhausted and a criminal statute's meaning remains grievously uncertain or ambiguous,
it should be read in a way that favors the defendant and does not impose criminal liability. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (using one interpreta-
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criminal liability are "inconsistent with the American legal tradition, and they hand too much power over to prosecutors, who can
then coerce plea deals."" Finally, Professor James Strazzella explained that while there is a perception that voting for more federal crime bills is a cost-free exercise, it is not.'oo Strazzella then
enumerated the costs of overcriminalization, including: the human cost (seen in the stories of the victim/impact witnesses); the
enhanced power given to prosecutors, whose discretion is virtually unreviewable by the courts; and the burdens imposed on the
federal judiciary, which must divert resources from criminal cases in which there are true federal interests.'0 '
Much of the 2010 hearing focused upon the failures of legislative draftsmanship in Congress: vague or unclear prohibitions
and, most prominently, the failure to attach meaningful mens
rea elements to federal crimes. 02 Notably, the Subcommittee received a report prepared by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") and the Heritage Foundation that
addressed the mens rea problem.' Representatives of both organizations--Jim Lavine of the NACDL and Brian Walsh of The
Heritage Foundation-also testified at the hearing and discussed
the study.o' The report studied 446 non-violent, non-drug criminal offenses proposed in the 109th Congress and found that fiftyseven percent of those had either no, or only a very weak, mens
rea requirement. 0 ' Only about eight percent had what the report
described as "strong" mens rea requirements.' The report included this phenomenon as part of a larger problem of defining
crime at the federal level that includes sloppy drafting, failure to
tion of the rule of lenity). But see Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2420,
2420, 2423-24 (2006) (discussing evolving formulations of the rule of lenity).
99. 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 16, at 22 (statement of Timothy
Lynch, CATO Institute).
100. Id. at 5, 66 (statement of James A. Strazzella, Professor, Temple University,
Beasley School of Law).
101. See id. at 66.
102. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 1-2 (statement of Rep.
Robert C. Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.).
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 11 (statement of Jim Lavine, President, National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers); id. at 46 (statement of Brian W. Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow,
The Heritage Foundation).
105. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, THE HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT'L ASS'N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: How CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL
INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW ix, 12 (2010).
106. Id. at 12.
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report proposed criminal offenses to the committees with expertise (the Judiciary Committee in each chamber), and delegation
to executive agencies of responsibility to criminalize certain conduct.1o7 The report ultimately recommended, among other things,
that Congress enact default rules that require proof of mens rea
where such an element is lacking and codify the rule of lenity and
that the Judiciary Committees in the House and Senate oversee
every proposed federal crime.'os
The 2010 hearing made prosecutorial discretion a prominent
topic as well. During one exchange, Representative Gohmert discussed one of the cases before the Committee-Abner Shoenwetter's conviction and eight-year sentence for purchasing lobster
tails that violated Honduran administrative regulations, despite
the fact that Honduran legal authorities objected to the prosecution and asserted the invalidity of their own regulations-and
expressed "shock" that an American prosecutor would even
charge such a case.'o "[N]o good prosecutor would take a case like
that," Representative Gohmert asserted."'0 During a dialogue
about the conviction of Bobby Unser for wandering unknowingly
into a wilderness area on a snowmobile during a blizzard, Professor Smith took the discussion a step further:
Well, that is what overcriminalization fundamentally is about. It is
about giving prosecutors, the executive branch, absolute power.
And it is not just the executive branch, it is each and every prosecutor. The hundreds of prosecutors across this country all have absolute power in their own areas. So any prosecutor with an ounce of
sense, maybe even a half an ounce, would not have charged Mr. Unser with this offense, but he was still charged and convicted.
And these two examples here are examples of how prosecutorial
discretion fails. And I think it is important for the Congress to realize it fails quite a lot."

Smith went on to explain that prosecutorial speculation about
persons they "know [are] up to no good" often drives charging decisions that are virtually unreviewable, thus leading to the ac-

107. Id. at 24-26.
108. Id. at 27-32.
109. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 3, 105 (statement of Rep.
Louie Gohmert, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec.).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 106-07 (statement of Stephen F. Smith, Professor of Law, University of
Notre Dame Law School).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

478

[Vol. 46:457

cumulation of absolute prosecutorial power.11 "That," he said, "is
what overcriminalization does."
Although both hearings and the Without Intent report that occupied a prominent place at the 2010 hearing focused upon nonviolent and non-drug crimes,114 many of the problems that the
hearings identified could also apply to more serious crimes, including those typically considered malum in se. Former federal
prosecutor Andrew Weismann noted the breadth of the problem
and gave the example of the federal child pornography laws that
do not require any mens rea regarding whether the viewer knows
the persons shown in a visual depiction of sex are minors."' Rather, he explained, the statute as written simply requires that
the viewer know that what he has received is a visual depiction,
enabling the Government to obtain a conviction even if the viewer did not know he was seeing a depiction of a minor engaged in
sex."6 Weismann described this as "insane," and elaborated upon
the example this way:
[T]he point is simply to illustrate, again, the limitations of prosecutorial discretion and also to see that even when we are talking about
real crimes, malum in se real crimes, crimes that should be punished, there, too, you have problems with crime definition.
So it is not just the technical regulatory offenses, it is all crimes.
That is how deep and corrosive the problem of overcriminalization
. 117

'S.

Both the 2009 and 2010 hearings, then, provide a useful window into the nature of the existing federal criminal law problem.
Buoyed by a constitutional doctrine of congressional power that
enforces few structural limits, as well as a mix of ordinary poli112. See id. at 107-08 (discussing the "absolute power" exercised by federal prosecutors).
113. Id. at 108.
114. See id. at 46-47 (statement of Brian W. Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow,
The Heritage Foundation); 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 16, at 1-2, 33
(statements of Robert C. Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., and Kathy Norris); WALSH & JOSLYN, supranote 105, at ix-x.
115. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearings, supra note 19, at 95-96, 109 (statement of
Andrew Weismann, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP).
116. See id. at 109. To correct this problem, the Supreme Court has held that the word
"knowingly" in the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, must be read as applying to both
the age of the performers and the sexually explicit nature of the material viewed. See
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252
(1977)).
117. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearings, supranote 19, at 109 (statement of Andrew
Weismann, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP).
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tics that countenances broadly crafted criminal legislation and is
naturally protective of law enforcement forces, the legislative
branch has created a massive body of criminal laws with the potential to capture a wide range of conduct. Indeed, so broad is the
federal criminal law that it often captures conduct of minimal,
even questionable, culpability. The problem then goes beyond
congressional crime-definition, implicating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the purposes of criminal punishment. But
is this problem one that Congress can actively police and correct?
III. A MORE ROBUST CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY
Having established a problem with the scope of federal criminal law, can the federal government do anything about it? The
dominant scholarship on federal criminal law reform tends to focus on the judiciary and executive branches, urging more robust
judicial review or internal reform in federal prosecutor's offices."
While some scholars urge statutory reform by Congress, the tendency among scholars more generally is to view congressional
oversight and investigation as either too weak or as a limited
auxiliary constraint on federal prosecutions."' The conventional
wisdom, then, seems to be that congressional oversight and investigation is available as an alternative, but likely ineffective,
as legislators have little incentive to reduce the scope of the criminal law or to resist requests of law enforcement officials in the
field who claim to need additional crime-fighting tools.120 My purpose here is to suggest that the congressional committee structure requires fresh thinking as a place where real criminal law
reform can at least begin, and that the 2009 and 2010 House
hearings serve as a reminder of both the virtues and vices of
committee oversight and investigation, offering lessons as to how
comprehensive federal criminal law reform could proceed. This
118. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 907 (referring to federal court oversight as
"[p]erhaps the most common suggestion for controlling prosecutorial abuse"); Ellen S.
Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "DiscretionaryJustice," 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 196 (2004) (suggesting various improvements to judicial review of
violations of DOJ guidelines).
119. Compare Barkow, supranote 14, at 911, (recognizing the difficulties of implementary and administering any potential oversight over prosecutors), with Podgor,supra note
118, at 198-200 (suggesting that congressional oversight could be used to police the Justice Department's compliance with its own internal guidelines).
120. See Barkow, supra note 12, at 911; Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supra note 40, at

545.
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section therefore discusses the nature and virtues of congressional inquiries (both fact finding for legislation, as well as oversight), places them in the context of federal criminal law reform,
and examines how the 2009 and 2010 hearings succeeded and
failed.
A. Fresh Thoughts About CongressionalInquiry and the Federal
CriminalLaw
Scholars have had comparatively little to say (and especially
little good to say) about congressional oversight and investigations and their relationship to the federal criminal law. It is easy
to see why.
Not all investigation and oversight is the same, nor is it usually attractive. Christopher Schroeder has described the difference
between programmatic oversight (hearings designed to focus on
the legitimate end of reviewing agency performance) and vendetta oversight (hearings conducted to harass or embarrass the
President or a member of his administration).12 ' And Ted Olsen
rightly noted that oversight is "not a sport for the faint-hearted,"
explaining the ways that power is exercised in Washington and
noting that the rough-and-tumble world of oversight is especially
severe when the White House and Congress are controlled by different parties.'2 2 Moreover, congressional hearings can result in
members grandstanding, speaking mainly to the C-SPAN cameras, or engaging in the "party line" oversight hearing-where
members of the President's party ask questions that are designed
to paint the administration's position and its representative in
the most positive light, while members of the opposing party ask
more difficult and probing questions designed to highlight the
administration's shortcomings or cast the administration's position as flawed.
This critique of committee room inadequacies is compelling
and has substantial merit. Still, the view of the relative uselessness of congressional investigation and oversight, while certainly
true in specific cases, is overstated.

121. See Symposium, Reforming Government Through Oversight:A Good or Bad Idea?,
13 J.L. & POL. 557, 563-65 (1997).
122. Id. at 567.
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1. The Nature and Scope of Congressional Investigative Power
First, the nature of congressional investigative power is sufficient to meaningfully attack the problem of the federal criminal
law behemoth. Although the Constitution does not specifically
enumerate the investigative power of Congress, legislative tradition and judicial precedent have established that it is an incident
of Congress's constitutional legislative authority.12 3 Congress
must be able to find facts and to develop evidence in order to carry out its enumerated legislative powers.2' Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that Congress's investigative power is
not only "inherent in the legislative process," but
[t]hat power is [also] broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or
political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.125

Still, the power is "not unlimited" and any inquiry "must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the CongeS,,126
gress."2

In addition, the hearing offers a chance for expert dialogue and
fact finding in ways that floor debate does not. As the 2009 and
2010 hearings demonstrate, the committee inquiry allows the
members to hear from experts in the field, who can offer legal
and historical perspectives that would assist members in deciding whether reducing the size of the criminal law is a worthy priority.127 As discussed above, these hearings showed how members
can obtain facts and perspectives from citizens affected by the
federal prosecutorial regime.12' Although all of this testimony can
be recounted on the House and Senate floors, floor debate is a

123.

See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1975); see also

LouIs FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 3-25 (2004) (describing the early
history of congressional investigative powers and clashes with the executive branch).
124. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
125. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).

126.
127.

Id.
See, e.g., 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 19, at 11-13, 46-48, 62-

63, 86-87, 95-97; 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 16, at 5-8, 20-22, 52-

53, 55-67.
128. See, e.g., 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 21-25, 35-38;
2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 16, at 33-36, 43-45.
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less optimal forum. In committee, unlike on the floor, members
can interact with the witnesses, probe their remarks, and ask
questions. Witnesses can also file documents with the committee,
which enhances the fact-finding process. There is thus greater
opportunity for developing facts and arguments through a committee inquiry. Of course, members can take to the floor during
consideration of the legislation and recount what the committee
inquiry uncovered, but only after first subjecting the views of experts and other witnesses to a rigorous examination in committee. Moreover, congressional inquiry carries with it the subpoena
power to aid in fact finding 29 and the power of contempt to help
ensure compliance with congressional requests and procedures.o
The nature of congressional inquiry, then, provides a useful
starting point for making this process a more visible part of federal criminal law reform.
2. Rethinking Ordinary Politics
Ordinary politics will almost always drive a congressional inquiry to some meaningful degree."' Just as ordinary politics-the
electoral benefits of appearing "tough on crime" and the lack of
an identifiable constituency worthy of protection that would benefit from reform-have shaped substantive federal crime legislation, so, too, should we expect it to influence congressional investigations and congressional oversight of the Justice Department.
Ordinary politics can influence the choice of topic for a factfinding hearing, just as it can influence whether an oversight
hearing focuses simply on agency performance or descends into
an effort to embarrass the President or a member of his administration (the programmatic oversight versus vendetta oversight
described earlier, which sometimes can merge into one another
during a given hearing). Moreover, however weak the institutional incentives are to conduct robust oversight of the Executive,
the political incentives become stronger if the congressional

129.

See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 206, 226-30 (1821); see also

FISHER, supra note 123, at 91-109 (describing some historical instances of congressional
use of its subpoena power).

130. See Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 226-30; see also FISHER, supra note 123, at
111-34 (describing historical uses of the contempt power).
131. See Kriner, supra note 33, at 782.
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committee conducting the oversight is controlled by a party that
is not the President's.
Both the 2009 and 2010 subcommittee hearings demonstrate
that congressional inquiry can offer ordinary politics a dose of
what politicians seem to crave: real stories from American citizens that politicians can use to put a citizen's face onto a political
issue or solution; here, citizens affected by the scope of federal
prosecutorial power."'
For example, racing legend Bobby Unser testified at the 2010
hearing concerning his prosecution for violating a regulatory provision that made it a strict liability crime to snowmobile in National Forest Wilderness."' Unser and a friend were snowmobiling in the mountains between Colorado and New Mexico when
they encountered a ground blizzard.' They wandered into a national wilderness area, which according to Unser was unmarked,
and were forced to abandon Unser's snowmobile once it broke
down in the blizzard.' Unser explained that they suffered from
exhaustion, hunger, hypothermia, and frostbite as they tried to
find shelter from the storm." When he later reached out to the
Forest Service for help in recovering his snowmobile, he learned
that he was being investigated and that he would be charged
with a crime under the federal regulations.
Kathy Norris testified at the 2009 hearing about her husband
George's prosecution related to his importation of orchids from
South America.3 3 He was charged with making false statements
and conspiracy arising from the mislabeled shipment of orchids
for his flower business, some of which were not approved for export under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species.4 o Kathy Norris described her shock and amazement as
132. See id. at 791 ("[O]nly in divided government do partisan incentives reinforce the
weak institutional incentives driving legislators to oversee the executive aggressively.").
133. See, e.g., 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 19, at 21-25, 35-38;
2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 16, at 33-36, 43-45.
134. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 22 (statement of Bobby Unser).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id. at 23-24; see also Fields & Emshwiller, supranote 6 (describing Unser's case).
139. 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 16, at 33-34 (statement of Kathy
Norris).
140. Id. at 33-34, 39.
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federal agents ransacked her home, giving no explanation whatsoever for their presence; the agents eventually returned eight of
thirty-seven boxes of documents taken from the house and broke
Norris's computer.14 ' George Norris's prosecution has received
substantial publicity as an example of federal criminal justice
and prosecutorial discretion gone awry,4 2 and Kathy Norris's testimony highlighted the breadth and depth of harm that can occur
when law enforcement officials exercise poor judgment in using
their enforcement discretion.'43
For another example, Krister Evertson, an Alaskan inventor
working on developing clean energy fuel cells, testified about his
prosecution for failing to place a mandatory sticker on a lawful
UPS shipment.'44 In his initial prosecution, the jury acquitted.'4 1
But while he was in jail on the labeling charges, the EPA opened
the storage tanks and declared them to contain hazardous materials.146 Naturally, the Justice Department sought additional
charges in a separate prosecution claiming that Evertson improperly stored hazardous waste, and that he illegally transported the waste when he drove it a half mile from his home to his
storage facility.'4 ' He was convicted and sent to federal prison.
Perhaps this story is a version of the "fire-alarm" oversight
that McCubbins and Schwartz describe, but one that results in a
public complaint at a congressional hearing rather than resolution within the agency or through some other congressional constituent service.'4 ' The hearings showed Congress is capable of locating a constituency that would represent the broader benefits
of reform and could prove sympathetic to the broader public. Ra-

141. Id. at 33.
142. See, e.g., 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 46 (statement of
Brian W. Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation) (describing the
Norris Case); Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners,ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 26 (reporting on the Norris Case).
143. 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 16, at 35-36 (statement of Kathy
Norris).
144. Id. at 44 (statement of Krister Evertson).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 44-45, 49.
148. Id. at 45; see also Quin Hillyer, Editorial, Part Two: Woe to the Man Who
Beats Federal Prosecutors, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 22, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://wash
ingtonexaminer.com/opinion/2009/01/part-two-use-man-who-beats-federal-prosecutors
(describing Evertson's case).
149. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supranote 29, at 166.
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ther than relying upon violent criminals, drug traffickers, or other unsympathetic figures, the House gathered low-level offenders
with innocuous backgrounds to demonstrate the need for certain
reforms, such as heightened mens rea requirements.' These lowlevel offenders helped to make a broader political point about reform: the federal criminal law is so vast in its scope and offers
such ineffective protection for conduct the actor believes to be innocent that anyone, even a citizen with no intention of committing a crime and no proclivities to do so, can be ensnared in the
federal prosecutorial web.
3. Rethinking Committees and Constitutional Dialogue
Congressional inquiries can also become important moments of
constitutionalism. Too often in modern American politics, official
rhetoric focuses on the immediate appeal of shallow talking
points to a mass audience. In doing so, it tends to become unhinged from institutional and constitutional concerns. Congressional inquiry is an ideal place to rethink rhetorical governance
and restore constitutional dialogue. In that setting, committee
members can hear a variety of perspectives from legal experts
and then probe those perspectives through a rigorous set of questions, taking advice from their own counsel and soberly deliberating on constitutional interpretation. Constitutional dialogue
would be enhanced to an even greater degree during oversight
hearings with the Justice Department, where members could
speak with Justice Department officials about the department's
understanding of its constitutional authority, and that of Congress. This same kind of dialogue has occurred with the Justice
Department in other contexts,"' and there is no reason that it

150. See, e.g., 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 3, 46-47 (statements of Rep. Louie Gohmert, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec., and Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation).
151. See, e.g., Voter Suppression: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6-8 (2008)
(statement of Asheesh Agarwal, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.); JusticeDepartment's Office
of Legal Counsel: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5-7 (2008) (statement of Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice); Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7-9 (2007) (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice).
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cannot be equally useful in the context of studying the scope of
the federal criminal law.
Because of its overlap with important constitutional issues related to both structure and rights, federal criminal law reform offers an ideal opportunity for this kind of constitutionalism to
flourish. A more aggressive congressional inquiry in this area
would thus contribute to a broader goal of engaging in constitutional dialogue, with itself and with the executive branch. Members could speak to one another about such matters as the scope
of the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. As
I have demonstrated, a chief argument against the current scope
of federal criminal law is that much of it is not constitutionally
authorized. Of course, this proposition is debatable depending
upon one's approach to constitutional interpretation and adjudication, but it is a debate worth having, not just in the courts or in
the law reviews, but in Congress. Members of Congress have a
constitutional duty to support the Constitution and should consider the enumerated constitutional powers they exercise whenever they propose and enact legislation. Unfortunately, the 2009
and 2010 hearings did not devote substantial time to a discussion
of Congress's constitutional authority to define crimes, although
it is fair to conclude that the discussions about vagueness and
overbreadth of the federal criminal law implicate potential due
process problems, as well as statutory drafting problems.
Perhaps one primary reason for the relative inattention to
structural constitutional authority at the hearings is this: members of Congress may not want to interpret their constitutional
authority in restrictive ways, or may not want do so publicly for
fear that any future legislation may reveal interpretive hypocrisy. This is a reasonable concern, but one that is overstated and
overlooks the relevance of rethinking ordinary politics in this
context. Indeed, constitutionalism in the congressional inquiry on
federal criminal law can simultaneously appeal to and transcend
ordinary politics. The scope of federal constitutional authority occupies a prominent place today in American political debate.
Some representatives and senators may garner measurable polit-

152. See 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 19, at 1-2 (statement of Rep.
Robert C. Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.); 2009
Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 16, at 1 (statement of Rep. Robert Scott,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.).
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ical gains from engaging this issue publicly, as many have done
recently in other areas of federal legislation.' Of course, the political upside may wax and wane: legislators will likely feel more
comfortable engaging in this kind of constitutional dialogue when
the nation is in a mood (as it arguably is today)154 that is skeptical
of federal power, when the representative or senator is elected
from a safely conservative district or state, or where the member
of Congress has made federalism and the growth of federal power
a campaign issue. A member who questions the scope of federal
criminal law in this way can always rebut any "soft on crime" allegations by arguing that he or she is merely trying to safeguard
constitutional boundaries while allowing certain socially harmful
conduct to still be punishable under state criminal law (where the
constitutional limit at issue is a structural one). Yet regardless of
the political upside to the constitutionalist critique of federal
criminal law; institutions and the political system would benefit
from constitutionalizing the debate and rhetoric that accompanies it.

153. See, e.g., Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Lamar Smith, Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (expressing doubts about the federal government's power to impose a mandate that all Americans purchase health insurance); Press Release, Office of
Congressman Ted Poe, Statement on Health Care Ruling (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http:
//poe.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=227204 (asserting that federal
health care legislation is unconstitutional).
154. A recent edition of Publius offers several excellent analyses of public opinion concernig the distribution of governmental power in America, and of criminal law enforcement specifically. One study shows considerable support for the notion that state and local governments should "take the lead" in dealing broadly with crime (although federal
and state/local preferences seem to be more equal on matters of controlling illegal firearms and narcotics). See Saundra K. Schneider et al., Public Opinion Toward Intergovernmental Policy Responsibilities, 41 PUBLIUS 1, 8 (Winter 2011); see also John Kincaid &

Richard L. Cole, Citizen Attitudes Toward Issues of Federalism in Canada, Mexico, and
the United States, 41 PUBLIUS 53, 71 (Winter 2011) (concluding that the research showed
"Americans and Canadians expressed the least trust in their federal governments and the
most trust in their local governments" and that respondents in each country "agreed that
their federal government has too much power"). But see Lemos, supra note 66, at 1251
(arguing that "[flederalism-based arguments do not resonate well with voters, who tend to
focus on political outcomes rather than the reasons for them"). Lemos wrote in 2006, and
one may wonder whether the current political mood of voters concerning the scope of federal power might change Lemos's view.
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4. Justice Department Oversight
Direct oversight of the Justice Department (the kind of police
patrol oversight that McCubbins and Schwartz distinguish)"' of
course differs from a fact-finding investigation designed to adduce information from experts and from citizens relevant to
pending or contemplated legislation, but it can have many of the
same effects in terms of controlling both the content of the law as
well the manner in which it is applied.'56 Justice Department
oversight allows Congress an opportunity to ask specific questions of Justice Department leaders in a public, often widely
broadcast, setting. Sometimes the oversight hearing may focus
only upon the wisdom of a particular piece of crime legislation,
often with the federal government's representative advocating
the new criminal law tool, whether it be a new criminal statute,
some procedural mechanism for law enforcement, or continued
congressional funding for programmatic activities."' But even
this kind of setting enables members of Congress to rigorously
challenge department leaders on the necessity for any given expansion of the federal prosecutorial regime. The downside is that
committee members may fail to do this, instead passively accepting, or merely giving deference to, the Justice Department's assessments of its prosecutorial and enforcement needs."'
Especially notable in the direct oversight context is the substantial criticism leveled against the Justice Department's exercise of prosecutorial discretion during the aforementioned 2009
5 In light of this exercise, future oversight
and 2010 hearings."
hearings could ask the department to publicly account for its
charging practices, plea bargaining practices, or sentencing recommendations in general, or perhaps even in particular cases

155. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 165-66.
156. See Jack M. Beermann, CongressionalAdministration,43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61,
125-27 (2006) (noting that oversight is an example of how Congress informally controls
law execution and using as an example congressional oversight of Justice Department
criminal investigations and prosecutions).
157. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation (PartII): Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 36 (2008) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation) (asking for congressional assistance in supporting violent crime
initiatives).
158. See Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supra note 40, at 545 (explaining the political
incentives to defer to the Justice Department's preferences).
159. See supraPart II.D. and accompanying notes.

2012]

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY AND THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

489

(though not in open investigations and not in ways that attempt
to apply political pressure on Justice Department officials to
make particular prosecutorial decisions).' This setting offers the
most dramatic opportunities for conflict, because the department
can typically refuse to disclose any information that would reveal
the deliberative processes by which such decisions were made or
information that would compromise the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings; or it may invoke other recognized privileges, thus
setting up a potential congressional-executive dispute over access
to information and documents.' Most requests for information
from the department do not result in much controversy and are
handled through negotiation, accommodation, and compromise."'
But even if the separation of powers permits the Justice Department to assert its own prerogatives against Congress (as I believe
it does), or arguably permits the Justice Department to withhold
some information from Congress (as I believe it does), Congress
nevertheless has some of its own institutional muscle by which it
can at least seek access to some useful information. Indeed, it has
done so successfully in recent years-for example, during its 2007
investigation of the Bush administration's firing of several United States Attorneys,"'3 or its investigation into FBI corruption in
Boston in connection with access to organized crime inform-

160.

See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investiga-

tions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373, 1376-79 (2002).

161. See Roberto Iraola, CongressionalOversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for
Information Relating to Federal Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, 87 IOwA L.
REV. 1559, 1570-98 (2002); Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the
Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 632, 649-50
(1997); Peterson, supra note 159, at 1378; see also Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive

Access Disputes: Legal Standards and PoliticalSettlements, 9 J.L. & POL. 719, 719 (1993);
Louis Fisher, Invoking Executive Privilege: Navigating Ticklish Political Waters, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 583, 584 (2000). For the separation of powers implications of such an
inquiry, see infra Part III.C.
162. See Iraola, supra note 161, at 1586.

163. See, e.g., PreservingProsecutorialIndependence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: HearingsBefore the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007). Richman explains that this is one area in which Congress
"woke up" to take on the Administration. See Richman, PoliticalControl, supranote 36, at
2107-08. But Richman also notes that, simultaneously, Congress sought to protect assertions of the attorney-client privilege in corporate criminal investigations, even more so
than the Justice Department had chosen to do pursuant to the McNulty Memorandum
(which required the Main Justice's authorization prior to seeking waivers of attorneyclient privilege by corporate counsel). Id. at 2108-12. Richman characterizes this as the
"normal" state of congressional-executive relations in criminal enforcement matters: Congress prefers decentralized enforcement authority unless this generalized interest is
trumped by a special policy preference. Id. at 2115-16.
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1 4
Again, in light of the criticism of prosecutorial discretion
ants.m
that emerged from the hearings (especially Stephen Smith's
compelling observation that absolute power in prosecutors is a
direct consequence of overcriminalization),"' and in light of the
weak external constraints on such discretion, this topic could
bring to bear some of the most useful information that Congress
could potentially find about how to rethink the state of federal
criminal law. This topic would thus follow naturally from the
process that the 2009 and 2010 hearings began.

Once the Crime Subcommittee heard the stories of citizens like
George and Kathy Norris,"' Krister Evertson,' Bobby Unser,m'
and Abner Schoenwetter, 6 9 the subcommittee could have convened a separate hearing to ask Justice Department officials how
its prosecutors can justify prosecuting these or similar acts, or
why it might recommend lengthy sentences for offenders who do
minimal personal and social harm and represent no real danger
to the community. The relevant committees could have convened
separate hearings on new legislation to codify the rule of lenity,
as was suggested at each hearing,o or to expand the mistake of
law doctrine, at least in cases that are less serious and do not involve violence, and then asked a representative of the Justice
Department to offer its views on such legislation. The committees
could alternatively have convened oversight hearings in which
the Justice Department would be asked about the circumstances
under which it would use its discretion to decline prosecution of a

164. See Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct in New England-Vol. 1: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. 2-3, 330 (200102) (statement of Dan Burton, Chairman, H. Comm. on Gov't Reform) (discussing the FBI
investigation and conviction of Joseph Salvati under J. Edgar Hoover over thirty years
prior and the difficulty Congress had in overcoming executive privilege to obtain information from the FBI regarding the case); see also Fisher, supra note 123, at 91-109 (discussing various examples of Congressional access to Justice Department information).
165. 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 19, at 107 (statement of Steven F.
Smith, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School).
166. 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 16, at 33 (statement of Kathy
Norris).
167. Id. at 43 (statement of Krister Everston).
168. 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 19, at 21 (statement of Robert
Unser).
169. Id. at 35 (Statement of Abner Schoenwetter).
170. See 2010 Over-CriminalizationHearing,supra note 19, at 47 (statement of Brian
Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation); 2009 OverCriminalizationHearings, supranote 16, at 22 (statement of Timothy Lynch, CATO Institute).
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defendant who violated an obscure federal law of which a reasonable person would not be expected to know, and did so with no
significant mens rea and no knowledge of the law, and who represents no danger to the community or threat of future violations
once on notice of the provision he or she violated. The committees
could also ask the department when a defendant like this should
simply be notified that he or she has violated a criminal law,
warned of what the law proscribes, and then assured of prosecution in the event of a future violation. These types of hearings
would not interfere with the exercise of discretion, nor apply any
political pressure, in any case. Rather, they would provide Congress with information that might allow it to better construct
ameliorative legislation. The failure to do so was a missed opportunity by the 111th Congress and the subcommittee, an opportunity to demonstrate its concerns about specific cases but also
an opportunity to use its institutional powers to challenge the
federal prosecutorial regime directly and aggressively.
B. Alternatives (or Supplements) to CongressionalInquiry
Some recent cases suggest a more aggressive judicial review of
the federal criminal law and prosecutorial regimes. This review
includes not just traditional review of the scope of statutes and
their constitutionality, but also of prosecutorial discretion and
plea bargaining.
Indeed, these recent cases, and some members of the Supreme
Court, endeavor to limit federal criminal law on both constitutional and statutory interpretation grounds, suggesting that judicial review offers some hope for reining in the federal criminal
law."' The examples are many, but a few will suffice here. In
Carr v. United States, the Court narrowly read the federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") to apply
only to travel for interstate commerce that occurred after the
date of SORNA's enactment, thus preventing Congress from

171. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2232-35 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C.
2250(a) (2006)) (limiting § 2250(a)); Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886,
1888-89, 1892, 1894 (2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006)) (concluding that
§ 1028A(a)(1) requires the government to prove an element of knowledge); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994) (citing National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 58015872 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)) (concluding that the National Firearms Act requires the
government to prove an element of knowledge).
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reaching backward in time to punish failures to register as a sex
offender. 7 2 In Staples v. United States, the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Thomas, refused to interpret a provision of the National Firearms Act as a strict liability offense, thus requiring the
Government to prove a mens rea element before imposing criminal liability for failure to register certain firearms."'7 And in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, the Court found that the federal
aggravated identify theft statute required the Government to
show that the perpetrator knew he or she was transferring, using, or possessing the identification of another person.174 yet
whatever value these cases have as a method for controlling federal prosecutorial power under the substantive criminal law, that
value is limited in statutory interpretation matters because Congress could always amend the statutes at issue, or create new
ones, to resolve the interpretive problem in the government's favor. For example, Congress could always insert legislative history
to show that its use of the term "travels" applies retrospectively,
or that a particular offense was meant to be one of strict liability,
thus absolving prosecutors of the need to prove any mens rea.
Constitutional grounds would clearly form the more compelling
basis for controlling the scope of federal criminal law through judicial oversight. But this, too, has its limits. As I explained in
Part II, although the Court has placed some structural constraints on congressional exercises of the Commerce Clause, after
Raich, the Lopez-Morrison limits seem relatively anemic.'75 Comstock granted the government broad power pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause,"' and the congressional spending power continues to be governed by case law that is highly protective
of congressional prerogatives. 7 Moreover, the Court can always
refuse certiorari in any meritorious cases that could create judicial opportunities to limit federal criminal lawmaking power pursuant to relevant constitutional limits."' Additionally, the Court

172.
173.
174.
175.

130 S. Ct. at 2232-33, 2236 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)).
511 U.S. at 602 (citing National Firearms Act, 26 U.S. §§ 5801-5872).
129 S. Ct. at 1888-89, 1894 (2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 028A(a)(1)).
See supra Part II.

176. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 18).
177.
178.

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987).
See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 700 (2011) (Thomas, J., dis-

senting) (citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 931(a) (2006)) (explaining the problems with the majority's

denial of certiorari for a challenge to the constitutionality of James Guelff and Chris
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has taken a decidedly laissez faire view of prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining."' So while some constitutional bases
exist for restraining Congress in its definition of the criminal
law-aside from Lopez's understanding of the commerce power,
First Amendment"s' and Sixth Amendment"' doctrine have been
the most robust restraints on the substantive criminal law)judicial enforcement of those limits is not always reliable. Moreover, where such limits exist, Congress (as I explain further below) should be the first to enforce them.
Others have suggested structural reform within the Justice
Department.'8 2 Barkow has thoughtfully explained that, to avoid
the combination of legislative and executive powers that has
emerged in the Justice Department, the department should use
"[i]nternal [s]eparation" modeled on administrative law to check
prosecutorial conduct.' This design would divide those in the
prosecutor's offices by function, separating investigative and advocacy decisionmakers from adjudicative decisionmakers-those
who would make decisions about charge selection, plea acceptance, and motions for substantial assistance from cooperating defendants.' Barkow's proposal would complement, and not
conflict with, the more aggressive congressional oversight that I
advocate. Barkow considers this possibility, and does not deny
that greater legislative oversight could be asserted, but she finds
this unrealistic because "[t]he political process overwhelmingly

McCurly Body Armor Act of 2002, which made it a crime for a person with a previous conviction for a violent felony to purchase, own, or possess body armor).
179. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358, 361-62, 365 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 26263 (1971).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582, 1592 (2010) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 48 (2006)) (holding that federal law criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty
violates the First Amendment); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002)) (holding that state criminal
law banning cross burning with intent to intimidate violated the Free Speech Clause,
where the statute treated all cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 858 (1997) (citing Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(e), 230 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)) (invalidating criminal provisions of the
Communications Decency Act as violating the Free Speech Clause).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-28, 245-46 (2005) (citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e) (2000)) (invalidating mandatory aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines under the right to trial by jury, but holding that the guidelines may
continue to be employed in lower court's discretion).
182. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 896-906.
183. Id. at 869, 871 & n.9, 888-89, 895.
184. Id. at 896-98.
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favors prosecutors," and any oversight would ultimately attempt
to ensure that prosecutors were being "sufficiently tough."18 5 I
think Barkow's instincts about the political process are sound,
and her description of historical practices is accurate. What I
have endeavored to demonstrate here, however, is that there are
prospects for meaningful congressional oversight that can serve
important constitutional values and survive the conventional
wisdom about ordinary politics that Barkow finds prohibitive.
Meanwhile, for another example, Angela Davis has noted the
troubling 'hands-off approach" to the American prosecutor taken
by judges, legislatures, and the public, and has suggested a twopronged approach that would apply at both the federal and state
levels.18' First, she advocates creating public information departments to educate the public about the role and the function of the
prosecutor's office.'"' Second, she advocates creation of prosecution review boards to conduct random assessments of the prosecutor's office as well as review and manage specific complaints
brought by the public.8"' The review board would file a public report when its work was completed, and the report would refer to
specific practices that violated ABA standards for prosecutors
and make recommendations for internal or external discipline.'
Again, Davis's proposal would not displace congressional oversight; indeed, assuming the creation of these boards is done legislatively, it would function as a form of it. One significant downside to her proposal is that depending upon how the board's
members are selected and subject to removal, the proposal could
raise separation of powers concerns with regard to appointment
and/or removal authority. 90
Finally, John Baker has noticed a curious practice that, in his
view, inspires much mischief in federal criminal law. Baker tackles the problem of Justice Department lawyers who are detailed
to congressional committees and serve for a short time as counsel
185.

Id. at 911.

186. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 462, 464 (2001).
187. Id. at 462.
188. Id. at 462-63.

189. Id. at 463-64.
190. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147,
3163-64 (2010) (holding that dual for-cause removal limits violated separation of powers,
but vesting appointment of the board in Securities and Exchange Commission Commissioners did not violate the Appointments Clause); see also U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
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to representatives and senators.' According to Baker, this practice creates a "symbiosis between the [Justice Department] and
the Senate Judiciary Committee" that has contributed significantly to the expansion of federal criminal law.1' Just as we
would never tolerate a practice in which the Justice Department
detailed a lawyer to a federal judge's chambers as a law clerk and
allowed that lawyer to handle criminal cases (in which the department necessarily appears before the court), neither should
we tolerate a practice of allowing the department to detail attorneys to the Judiciary Committees and draft criminal legislation,
in which the department has an obvious interest.' Baker concludes the detailing practice may or may not be an affront to due
process, but it is an affront to the separation of powers.
Of course, the primary and most obvious tool is ordinary legislation, or perhaps adoption of a single comprehensive federal
criminal code (as Attorney General Thornburgh suggested at the
2009 hearing)," rather than a patchwork of criminal statutes
scattered throughout the United States Code. But Congress
seems averse to this. As I describe here, however, Congress could
overcome its aversion with better fact finding about the problems
of the existing criminal law regime. In a world without such reform (or, perhaps, even in a world with such reform), each of these aforementioned recommendations has merit. My object here
has not been to offer a critique of all of these alternatives to direct code reform or to suggest that they are misguided. Rather,
my effort has been to draw greater attention to the congressional
inquiry as an undervalued and underexplored mechanism for
achieving the ultimate goal of a leaner and more constitutionally
compatible federal criminal law. In short, meaningful code reform must necessarily follow a meaningful series of investigative
and oversight hearings.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See Baker, Strategies to Limit Expansion, supra note 10, at 571.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 576-77.
Id.
See 2009 Over-CriminalizationHearing, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of Hon.

Richard Thornburgh, former Att'y General of the United States).
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C. The Virtues of Confrontationand Conflict
This article's proposal does not advance the simple and naive
view that legislators and executive branch officials should just all
work together for the common criminal law good. Rather, the
proposal here invites, indeed encourages, conflict between the political branches. To the extent that I urge cooperation, I urge not
interbranch cooperation, but cooperation between members of the
same political institution-representatives defending the prerogatives of the House, senators defending the prerogatives of the
Senate, and the President and his administration defending the
prerogatives of the executive branch. Moreover, Congress should
not fear conflict with the Executive in this area, just as I am certain the Executive does not fear Congress. Rather, Congress
should embrace that conflict. Particularly in light of the weaknesses of judicial review as to both structural constitutional limits and judicially enforced limits on prosecutorial charging practices and plea bargaining, the congressional inquiry process
offers perhaps the most forceful and useful method for addressing
the mutual responsibility of Congress and the Justice Department for the troubling state of federal criminal justice. But, as
Jeffrey Tulis has explained, although hearings and investigations
represent ways that Congress can assert its prerogatives and defend its place in the constitutional order, "[t]he modern Congress
is unwilling to stand up for itself.""
The Constitution contemplates conflict, even stalemates, between the political branches' It is unconcerned with problem
solving or efficiency as ultimate ends, favoring safety instead,
recognizing the propensity for encroachments and the aggrandizement of power among men,"' and not just any men, but ambitious ones. As Madison famously described it, "[a]mbition must
be made to counteract ambition,"'99 and each branch is provided

196. Tulis, supra note 33, at 523-24.
197. See J. Richard Broughton, The Inaugural Address as Constitutional Statesmanship, 28 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 265, 283 (2010); see also Orrin G. Hatch, Avoidance of Constitutional Conflicts, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1987) (explaining that "interbranch con-

flicts are in part a product of design, in part a product of necessity").
198.

See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 122 (1991) (ex-

plaining Madison's approach to the separation of powers and the view that each branch
must have "means of self-defense to ward off encroachment").
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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with tools and institutional structure to help it fulfill its constitutional roles and resist encroachments.o There is little constitutional value, then, when one political branch deliberately lays
down its institutional weapons in acquiescence to, or fear of, the
other (absent some greater national interest). Congress retains
sufficient institutional weapons-the power of inquiry, among
them-to challenge the Executive's criminal law preferences.
Congressional inquiry challenging the preferences and prosecutorial practices of the Justice Department-whether indirectly
through fact finding that produces positive legislation or directly
through aggressive oversight-is, in short, a method of ambition
counteracting ambition; it is a proper channeling of the ambition
that the constitutional design assumes in its political leaders.
But its effectiveness may well depend upon representatives and
senators giving greater weight to institutional interests than to
political affiliation.201
There is, of course, some constitutional risk here and it demands a sober effort to strike an admittedly difficult constitutional balance. While constitutional conflict is desirable, it also
necessarily implicates concerns about the separation of powers.
And when it is Congress asserting authority, one must be mindful of Madison's observations that in republican government, the
legislative authority necessarily predominates2 02 and "is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power
into its impetuous vortex."203 So one caveat is that Congress
should tread carefully and avoid any effort to dictate how the executive branch executes the law pursuant to the President's constitutional role under the Take Care Clause.20 4 Oversight does not
imply legislative control over the Executive, and congressional

200. Id. at 318-19.
201. Although Fisher and I disagree about the precise scope of congressional power,
Fisher makes a similar point with which I agree. See FISHER, supra note 123, at 257 ("To
do [congressional investigation] well, lawmakers have to think of themselves as belonging
to an institution rather than to a composite of local interests."). Jeffrey Tulis has also
made thoughtful observations about the state of constitutional culture and consciousness
in Congress and the inability of Congress to defend itself despite the tools at its disposal;
the instant article is an effort to suggest how Congress might recapture at least some of
that consciousness. See Tulis, supra note 33, at 516-17, 520. Tulis, for instance, describes
the late Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia as an "anachronism," for he was an example of one who regularly defended the prerogatives of his institution first. Id. at 520.
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 312 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
203. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 306 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
204. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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committees should be careful not to exert such control or to exercise a "quintessentially executive function,"20 such as the prosecution of crimes or the selection of criminal charges.2 06 Nor should
Congress attempt to interfere with decisionmaking in an ongoing
investigation.207 So rather than attempt to control the exercise of
discretion by dictating charging decisions in specific cases (which
would raise serious separation of powers concerns), the committee could explore charging and plea bargaining practices as a way
of judging what the scope of a substantive criminal sanction
should be-a subject well within the scope of legislative power
and thus a legitimate topic for oversight. The committee could also use the topics of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing
recommendation practices to discover whether prosecutors are
abusing their power, a problem which Congress could address,
again, through redefining the substantive criminal law. Asserting legitimate constitutional prerogatives in ways that result in
conflict between the legislature and the Executive, then, must be
distinguished from assertions of authority that would accumulate
powers in a single department.
The other related problem concerns access to information.
Much has been written about congressional-executive access disputes in the context of oversight and executive privilege battles,
and I need not recount the discussion here.208 It suffices to say
that congressional requests for information will not, and need
not, necessarily result in obtaining it. As this area, however, is
one where courts have scarcely ventured and which typically is
resolved through a process of political negotiation and accommo-

205. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see FISHER,
supra note 123, at 5, 92.
206. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (describing a prosecutor's decision not to indict as the "special province of the Executive Branch").
207. See Peterson, supranote 160, at 1378.
208. See generally, e.g., FISHER, supra note 123, at xv; Emily Berman, Executive Privi-

lege Disputes Between Congress and the President:A Legislative Proposal,3 ALB. GOV'T L.
REV. 741, 743-50 (2010); Bush, supra note 161, at 719-20; Neal Devins, Congressional-

Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal-DoNothing, 48 ADMIN. L.
REV. 109, 109-10 (1996); James Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposalfor
Resolving Executive Privilege DisputesPrecipitatedby CongressionalSubpoenas, 21.HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 145, 145-47 (1984); Miller, supra note 160, at 632-35; David A. O'Neil, The
PoliticalSafeguards of Executive Privilege, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1079, 1080-83 (2007). I also
have discussed this problem in other contexts. See J. Richard Broughton, Paying Ambi-

tion's Debt: Can the Separation of Powers Tame the Impetuous Vortex of Congressional
Investigations?, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 797, 799-801 (2000) (discussing disputes between
Congress and the President over the issue of congressional investigations).
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dation, 20 s there is constitutional value in the conflict itself-each
of the political branches asserting its institutional prerogatives,
sometimes to stalemate, with forces of political muscle and public
interest ultimately determining the outcome.
Perhaps the Justice Department would ultimately prevail in
an access dispute, or perhaps-as is often the case, and as I have
recounted already-department leaders will politely defer to the
committee, promise cooperation, and assure the committee that
they will seriously consider the concerns the committee has
raised, only to return to the department and continue the practices that initially instigated the oversight.2 1 0 Perhaps the department is constitutionally entitled to do just that. But losing in
conflicts with the executive branch is not nearly as deep a blow to
the constitutional scheme as failing to suit up for a conflict in the
first place. The arrogance of the federal prosecutorial regime
cannot be cured with congressional passivity. And Congress
should be competent enough to own up to its own arrogance in
creating the existing federal criminal law behemoth. Moreover,
should the Justice Department fail to cooperate in the oversight
matter or should it cooperate for the day and then return to its
usual practice, this action ought to be sufficient incentive for
Congress to move forward with curative legislation consistent
with its own institutional lawmaking powers. In this sense, institutional loyalty should trump political loyalty.
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress suffers from a comprehensive lack of constitutional
awareness. It sometimes fails to respect the limits on its powers,
and at other times it fails to assert constitutional prerogatives
that it actually possesses to defend its institutional interests. The
problems with the current state of federal criminal law represent
an ideal example of this failure of constitutional consciousness,
as well as of the potential of congressional inquiry as a structural
way of achieving greater constitutional equilibrium in federal
crime definition and enforcement. On the one hand, the problem
is, to a significant degree, a problem of ultra vires legislating.
Congressional inquiry could better inform the Congress as to the

209.
210.

See Broughton, supra note 208, at 800; Iraola, supra note 161, at 1586.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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precise contours of its constitutional powers to define the criminal law, as well as give attention to the substantive doctrine that
could improve it. On the other hand, the problem is also one of
executive branch actors who wield tremendous influence over the
substance of federal criminal law with few meaningful external
checks, a matter fit for robust congressional oversight that remains respectful of the Executive's role in the constitutional design.
Of course, comprehensive reforms of the substantive federal
criminal law cannot occur merely through congressional hearings. Naturally, it takes floor action in the House and Senate,
and presidential assent, to achieve these legislative reforms. But
floor action is more likely if a meaningful committee inquiry has
preceded it and developed a legislative record demonstrating the
necessity for reform. Moreover, congressional oversight of the
Justice Department could potentially influence the ways in which
the department employs its prosecutorial and investigative discretion, thus also resulting in some positive impact upon the
scope of federal criminal law. The department may resist, but the
mere possibility of executive resistance should not deter congressional inquiry-indeed, there is much constitutional value in the
resistance and the congressional response to it. The assertion of
congressional prerogatives is no less constitutionally valuable
than the assertion of executive ones, but meaningful reform will
never come to fruition in the absence of congressional will to assert those prerogatives. My proposal here is meant to demonstrate that congressional inquiry can serve as an important, valuable step in either producing reforms or, at a minimum (and
perhaps as importantly), beginning a dialogue of constitutional
dimension with the executive branch and even (indirectly) the
judiciary about the nature and scope of federal criminal law.
The 2009 and 2010 hearings were a proper start, but, standing
alone, they hardly put a dent in the armor of the vast federal
criminal justice machinery. More-and more robust--congressional inquiry is both politically and constitutionally necessary.

